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ROUND TWO: ILLINOIS' SECOND GENERATION
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
Diane S. Kaplan*
INTRODUCTION
The Illinois General Assembly has twice enacted legislation designed to
alleviate the inequities resulting from corporate takeover attempts. The
Illinois Business Take-Over Act of 1978 (1978 Act)' regulated the tender offer
stage of the acquisition process and, like its thirty-six companion state
statutes,' was intended to provide state sanctioned defense tactics to domestic
corporations under the siege of a hostile takeover attempt. The United States
Supreme Court held the 1978 Act unconstitutional under the commerce clause
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., (MITE).' With the demise of the 1978 Act, the
remaining state takeover statutes fell like dominoes."
In August 1985, the Illinois General Assembly enacted5 its second gener-
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., 1971, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley; J.D., 1975, Yale Law School. The author wishes to express gratitude to
The John Marshall Law School, Associate Dean Helen M. Thatcher, its secretarial staff, and
research assistants Craig S. Donahue and Joseph P. Sorce for their insights, assistance, and
encouragement.
1. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51-137.70
(1979) (repealed 1983).
2. See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE
and Kidwell, 42 OMo ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
3. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
4. Federal and state appellate courts applying MITE throughout the country have held
first generation state takeover statutes unconstitutional as applied to tender offers. See, e.g.,
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma act);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan act); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri act); Empire, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri act). The courts have also found
takeover statutes unconstitutional as applied to open market purchases. See, e.g., Telvest, Inc.
v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia act); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d
768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky act); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 124 N.H. 1, 466 A.2d 919
(1983) (New Hampshire act).
5. On February 28, 1985, the late Senator Prescott Bloom introduced Senate Bill 0259
entitled, "Illinois Shareholder Protection Law." In general terms, S.B. 0259 provided certain
rights to minority shareholders in a takeover attempt and authorized the officers and directors
of the target company to consider the effects of any takeover on the employees, suppliers,
customers, and community of the company. Apparently, S.B. 0259 was intended to follow
Maryland's fair price legislation (MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (Supp.
1984)) which was heavily favored by those looking for a strong departure from the Edgar v.
MITE type takeover statute. Shortly thereafter, on April 12, 1985, House Representative Robert
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ation of takeover legislation 6 in the form of two amendments to the Business
Churchill introduced House Bill 2138, designed to create the "Illinois Corporate Take-Over
Act." In practical terms, H.B. 2138 was a thinly disguised attempt to reintroduce many of the
provisions of the original 1978 Business Take-Over Act such as the regulation of takeovers by
the Secretary of State and pre-takeover notification and hearing requirements. Hence, in the
spring of 1985, two separate takeover statutes were pending in the General Assembly.
Eventually, a consensus developed in favor of S.B. 0259 and, on May 22, 1985, the bill was
permanently sent to the House Judiciary Committee for interim study. With the focus now
clearly on S.B. 0259, two Amendments to the Business Corporation Act of 1983 were proposed
and accepted by the House Judiciary Committee. On June 30, 1985 the Senate concurred in
the House Amendments and on August 23, 1985 Governor Thompson signed the Amendments
as Public Act 82-204. For a discussion of the legislative history, see Interviews with Joan
Coogan, Legislative Assistant to the Chicago Bar Association (Feb. 1986 and Aug. 11, 1986).
See also Session Illinois General Assembly - Final Legislative Synopsis and Digest 163 (1985)
(summarizing legislative development of Amendments).
6. Second generation takeover statutes are so named because they proceeded after MITE,
while first generation statutes preceded MITE. The first generation statutes basically attempted
to regulate the tender offer stage of the acquisition by tracking the provisions of the federal
tender offer rules under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). Second
generation statutes generally attempt to regulate the second stage of the takeover in which the
corporation undergoes a fundamental corporate change. Such statutes fall into two broad
categories: (i) "control share acquisition" statutes which require advance board or shareholder
approval before a bidder can vote certain levels of stock acquired in the target; and (ii) "fair
price/business combination" statutes which require the bidder to comply either with certain
pricing procedures or with certain shareholder. supermajority voting requirements before causing
the corporation to enter into a fundamental corporate change.
The following states have adopted "control share acquisition" statutes. See HAWAH REv.
STAT. §§ 416-171 to -172 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42 to -42-11 (Burns Supp.
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 901 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01-.13
(West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01-1701.831 (Page Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5 (Supp.
1986). The following states have enacted "fair price/business combination" -statutes. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33.374(a)-(c) (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -234 (1986); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51-137.70 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-43-1 to -1-43-
24 (Burns 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.396-.398 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:132-134 (West 1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200 (775)-(784) (Callaghan 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-25-1 to -25-7 (Supp.
1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon
Supp. 1986) (repealed 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West 1986). Second generation
legislation is pending in California and New Jersey.
For decisions concerning "control share acquisition" statutes, see Fleet Aerospace Corp. v.
Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1623 (1987) (holding
Ohio's statute unconstitutional under both the supremacy and commerce clauses); Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (Court reversed
Seventh Circuit holding that Indiana statute was unconstitutional under both the supremacy
and commerce clauses); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.
Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, Nos. 85-5285/5286-MN (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1986) (holding the
Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act unconstitutional under the commerce clause); Icahn
v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding the Missouri Control Share Acquisition
Act unconstitutional, as applied to foreign corporations, under both the commerce clause and
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Corporation Act of 1983 (Business Corporation Act). 7 Unlike the 1978 Act,
which explicitly regulated tender offers, sections 7.85' and 8.851 (Amend-
ments) purport to regulate only the internal affairs of "domestic corporations" 10
by defining the rights and duties between minority and majority shareholders
in the second stage of the front-end-loaded takeover." Section 7.85 requires
a successful tender offeror who has become an "Interested Shareholder" 12
to comply with either "supermajority" voting requirements or "price and
procedure" requirements before securing control over the target.'" Section
8.85 permits target management to consider as within the "best interests of
the corporation" the effects of "any action" upon the corporation's em-
ployees, suppliers, customers, and community. 4 Together, sections 7.85 and
8.85 provide incumbent management of domestic corporations with two
potent lines of defense against the modern hostile takeover. While section
7.85 fortifies the board's defense posture against the offeror by escalating
the risks and expenses of undertaking an unfriendly acquisition, section 8.85
thwarts shareholder challenges to the board's defense strategy.
Section I of this Article sets forth preliminary historical information
placing Illinois' second generation takeover legislation in its legal context.
Section II summarizes, explains, and demonstrates pertinent provisions of
the Amendments. Section III assesses the constitutional implications of the
Amendments under the supremacy and commerce clauses of the federal
Constitution. Section IV concludes that the Amendments have failed to
negotiate successfully the obstacles posed by Edgar v. MITE and, hence,
must fall under either the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, or both.
I. BACKGROUND
The Amendments represent the General Assembly's response to two
developments: the Supreme Court's majority holding in Edgar v. MITE that
supremacy clause); Terry v. Yamashita, [1986-87] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,111 and
94,112-14 (1986) (holding Hawaii's statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause). To
date, there are no reported decisions on the constitutionality of the "fair price/business
combination" statutes.
7. Business Corporation Act of 1983, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.01-17.05 (Supp.
1985). The takeover amendments were added by Public Act 84-204, effective Aug. 23, 1985.
8. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.
9. Id. § 8.85.
10. The Business Corporation Act of 1983 section 1.80 defines "domestic corporation" as
all corporations subject to the BCA's provisions, except foreign corporations. See infra notes
123-28 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. See also Scriggins & Clark, Takeovers
and The 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266, 267-70 (1984) (historical
background of front-end-loaded takeover strategy).
12. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.C(2).
13. Id. § 7.85.
14. Id. § 8.85.
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the 1978 Act violated the commerce clause of the Constitution" and the
development of the two tiered front-end-loaded takeover.'
6
A. Edgar v. MITE
The 1978 Act regulated the tender offer stage of the takeover by imposing
procedural and substantive requirements on the tender offeror.' 7 According
to its proponents, the 1978 Act's primary purpose was to protect resident
shareholders of Illinois corporations from the coercive effects of a tender
offer.'" The 1978 Act's requirements, however, extended to all tender offers,
not just those of a purely domestic nature. 9 For example, the 1978 Act
defined "target" as any corporation owned by at least ten percent of
Illinois residents or for which any two of the following three conditions were
met: (i) the corporation's headquarters were located in Illinois, (ii) the
corporation was incorporated under Illinois law, (iii) at least ten peicent of
the corporation's stated capital and paid-in surplus were represented within
Illinois.20
The 1978 Act also contained a precommencement notification provision
requiring the offeror to file a registration statement with the Secretary of
State and the target twenty days prior to the tender offer's commencement. 2'
The 1978 Act prohibited the offeror from communicating with the target's
shareholders during this period although the target was not similarly re-
stricted.22 The twenty day registration period could be extended indefinitely
if either the Secretary or the target requested a hearing for the protection
15. MITE, 457 U.S. 624.
16. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982)
and infra note 41. Bendix attempted a front-end-loaded takeover of Martin Marietta by tender
offering 70% of Marietta's stock at $48.00 per share. Bendix then intended to merge the two
companies by offering the remaining Marietta shareholders $0.82 of Bendix stock for each
share of Marietta. Id. at 625. Bendix did not guarantee any minimum amount of consideration
in the share exchange. Id. at 625 n.2. Marietta countered with its own "pac-man" strategy
whereby it tender offered for $75.00 per Bendix share with the intention of merging out the
remaining shareholders by an exchange offering of 1 2/3 shares of Marietta per each Bendix
share. Id. Into this fray leapt United Technologies Corporation with a $75.00, soon increased
to $85.00, tender offer for Bendix. Id. Not surprisingly, everyone went to court. Bendix sued
to enjoin the Maryland Corporate Takeover Law; Marietta sued Bendix for misrepresentations
and omissions in its disclosure materials; Bendix counterclaimed that Marietta's countertender
was illegal; United Technologies sued to enjoin Bendix from amending its charter to frustrate
tenders for Bendix; Bendix countered United Technologies arguing that its tender offer violated
antitrust laws. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 547 F. Supp. 533, 534 n.5 (D. Md.
1982).
17. Illinois Business Take-Over Act §§ 137.54-137.57.
18. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644-46.
19. Id. at 641-43.
20. Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 137.52-10(a)-(c).
21. Id. § 137.54.E.
22. Id. § 137.59.G.
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of the offerees. If the Secretary determined at the hearing that the terms of
the offer were unfair or illegal, the tender offer could be denied registration.23
The 1978 Act was challenged in January of 1979 by MITE, a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Connecticut. MITE simultaneously made a
cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine
Company (Chicago Rivet), an Illinois corporation doing business primarily
in Pennsylvania, and filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from the 1978 Act on the grounds that it violated the
supremacy and commerce clauses. 24 Three days later, Chicago Rivet filed a
declaratory and injunctive action in Pennsylvania alleging that MITE's Illi-
nois tender offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. 25 After
an unsuccessful skirmish in the Pennsylvania courts, Chicago Rivet turned
its attention to the Illinois Act and, under its protection, self-tendered for
forty percent of its own outstanding stock.26 Within days, the district court
permanently enjoined enforcement of the 1978 Act on the grounds that it
violated both the supremacy and commerce clauses.2 7 Shortly after entry of
the final judgment, both MITE and Chicago Rivet withdrew their tender
offers.28 On appeal by the Secretary of State, the district court's rulings were
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit29 and affirmed in part by the Supreme
Court.30
The Court articulated several objections to the 1978 Act. As a threshold
matter, the Court rejected the applicability of the internal affairs doctrine
in the tender offer context:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes
that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs - matters peculiar to the relationships among or between
the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders -
because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands
.... That doctrine is of little use to the State in this context. Tender
offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.3
23. Id. § 137.57.A.
24. MITE, 457 U.S. at 627-28.
25. Id. The Pennsylvania Securities Commission chose not to invoke the takeover protections
provided in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-79 (Purdon 1986). Chicago Rivet then moved for a
temporary restraining order which was denied by the U.S. District Court, Western District of
Pennsylvania. MITE, 457 U.S. at 628 n.3.
26. MITE, 457 U.S. at 629. Section 137.52-9(4) of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act
exempted from regulation a company's offer for its own shares.
27. MITE, 457 U.S. at 629.
28. Id.
29. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1983).
30. MITE, 457 U.S. at 624.
31. Id. at 645 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment b
(1971)).
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The Court's commerce clause analysis questioned as both over- and under-
inclusive the 1978 Act's purported purpose of protecting resident sharehold-
ers. 32 The Court found the 1978 Act to be overinclusive in that its broad
definition of target33 allowed Illinois to regulate acquisitional activities of
foreign corporations "even if not a single ...shareholder were a resident
of Illinois," ' 34 and thus, imposed extraterritorial burdens on interstate com-
merce which exceeded the local interests it purported to protect. 3" The Court
found the 1978 Act to be underinclusive in that its time and informational
requirements 6 already were provided by the Williams Act, thus failing to
protect "substantially" even resident shareholders." The Court also noted
that the pro-management bias inherent in the notice, hearing, and fairness
provisions discriminated against the offeror in violation of the Williams
Act's requirement of neutrality. between incumbent management and the
takeover bidder." For these reasons, a majority of the Court struck down
the 1978 Act as violative of the commerce clause and three justices opined
that the 1978 Act violated the supremacy clause as well.3 9
B. The Front-End-Loaded Takeover
The front-end-loaded takeover is an acquisitional strategy whereby the ac-
quiror typically makes a cash tender offer for a percentage of the target's
32. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
33. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for the 1978 Act's definition of target.
34. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
35. Id. at 644-45.
36. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for the 1978 Act's time and informational
requirements.
37. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644-45.
38. The Williams Act Amendments, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982), sought to
ensure that "public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will
not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and
intentions of the offering party." Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)
(citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967)) [hereinafter Senate Report]. The Senate
Report recognized that "takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful
purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management." Senate Report, supra,
at 3. The result was an attempt to enact a law furthering the federal "policy of neutrality in
contests for control." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). As recognized
in Rondeau, the drafters of the Williams Act emphasized that they had taken extreme care "to
avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover" bid and that the bill was "designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit
of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity
to fairly present their case." 422 U.S. at 58 (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,
4 (1967); See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); Junewicz, infra note 95, at
143-45.
39. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646. Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor held the law violated
only the commerce clause. Id. at 630-40. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun
concurred that the law violated the supremacy clause as well. Id. at 646-54. Justices Rehnquist,
Marshall, and Brennan held the appeal was moot. Id. at 655, 664. See Sargent, The Rise and
Fall of First Generation State Takeover Statutes, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION: THE SECOND GENERATION STATUTES 192-95 (1986)
(MITE reflected disagreement on whether the states could regulate tender offers).
[Vol. 36:361
ILLINOIS TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
shares sufficient to obtain voting control over the target,"' and then, assum-
ing the success of the tender offer, secures control over the target by merg-
ing it with or consolidating it into the acquiror or one of its affiliates.
4
'
Pursuant to this second transaction, the remaining shareholders are offered
either cash for their stock or an exchange of their stock for the equity or
debt of the acquiror. The value of the cash-out or exchange offer, however,
is usually substantially less than either the cash paid for identical stock in
the tender offer 2 or the market value of the stock before the tender offer. 3
Because of the coercive nature of this takeover strategy, the target's
shareholders rush to tender in the first stage of the acquisition to avoid be-
ing forced out at an inadequate price in the second stage. 4 4 The front-end-
loaded takeover has met with considerable success and criticism' 5 because
it frequently enables the acquiror to purchase the assets of the target "for
a combined price that is less than their real value."
4
II. THE AMENDMENTS
A. Definitions
Section 7.85.A defines "target" as any "domestic corporation,"'4 not
otherwise exempted,'48 which has at least one class of equity securities reg-
40. See, e.g., Bendix, 549 F. Supp. at 625. At this point, the shareholder faces the difficult
choices of retaining his shares and risking devaluation should the tender offer succeed, imme-
diately tendering his shares to secure the full price for all shares, waiting out the current offer
in the hope that the market will force the offeror to increase the offering price, waiting for a
competing bidder to offer a better price, or selling his stock on the open market where often
the mere announcement of a tender offer will raise the value of the target's stock.
41. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 266 (state corporation laws generally permit
merger upon approval by simple majority).
42. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107
S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982);
Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d (Ky. 1982). See also Scriggins & Clark, supra note
11, at 267 (remaining shareholders in tender offer will suffer loss).
43. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITrEs REGULATION 570 (1983) (tender
offers are often followed by a second offer for less value, a freeze-out merger, or both).
44. See Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (tender offers coerce
sales to the offeror because the fear of a squeeze-out compels the shareholders to sell or risk
loss in the value of their investment).
45. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d at 252 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107
S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Bendix, 549 F. Supp. at 630. See generally Scriggins & Clark, supra note
11, at 271 n.23 (illustrating the breadth of articles written on anti-takeover legislation).
46. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 267.
47. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 1.80(a).
48. Id. § 7.85.A. This section exempts domestic corporations which do not have securities
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and which neither have adopted nor
amended their articles to include section 7.85. Id. A domestic corporation may "opt out" of
section 7.85 provided it amends, repeals, or adopts provisions inconsistent with section 7.85 by
the affirmative vote of (i) 80% of the total outstanding voting shares and (ii) a majority of the
19871
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istered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or which has adopted or
amended its articles to include section 7.85. 49 Sections 1.80(a) and (b) of the
Business Corporation Act"° limit the definition of "domestic corpor-
ation" to any corporation which is subject to its provisions and which is
not incorporated under the laws of any other state.
An "Interested Shareholder"'" is any acquiror who, as determined by a
majority of the "Disinterested Directors,15 2 has obtained either ten percent
of the combined voting power of the target's outstanding shares53 or which,
as an affiliate or associate of the target, has acquired beneficial ownership
of ten percent of the combined voting power of the target's outstanding
stock two years prior to "the date in question." 4 A "Disinterested Director"
is any member of the target's board who acquired his directorship free of
the Interested Shareholder's influence and includes any person who was
either a member of the target's board prior to the time the Interested
Shareholder became an Interested Shareholder or who was recommended to
total voting shares held by Disinterested Shareholders. Id. Section 1.80 excludes from the
definition of "domestic corporation" any "foreign corporation," which is defined as "a
corporation for profit organized under laws other than the laws of this state, but shall not
include a foreign banking corporation organized under the laws of a country other than the
United States. ... Id. § 1.80(b).
Compare Illinois' exemption provisions with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33.374(a)-(c) (West
1985) (exempts corporations not required to file reports pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1982)); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-2-231 to -235 (1985) (Georgia's supermajority/formula price provisions will not apply to a
corporation that has not amended or adopted its bylaws to specifically include these provisions.
Once adopted, the bylaw can only be repealed by a vote of two-thirds of the continuing directors
and a majority of votes represented by disinterested shareholders or such higher vote as is
required by the articles or bylaws. Moreover, such repeal is irrevocable); Ky. REv. STAT. §
271A.397 (Baldwin 1986) (exempts corporations having fewer than 500 shareholders, investment
companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, bank or holding companies
registered under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, savings and loan companies as
defined in the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, and domestic insurers
as defined under certain provisions of Kentucky's corporate law); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE
ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (Supp. 1984) (exempts corporations having fewer than
100 shareholders). See generally Voran & Ponns-Townley, An Overview of State Takeover
Regulation, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN STATE TAKEOVER REGU-
LATION: THE SECOND GENERATION STATUTES 45-46 (1986).
49. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 1.80(a), (b).
50. Id. § 7.85.
51. Id. § 7.85.C(2). Hereinafter, the term "Interested Shareholder" shall include any affiliate
or associate thereof as defined by Rule 126-2 of the General Rules and Regulations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. § 7.85.C(5).
52. Id. § 7.85.C(9).
53. Id. § 7.85.C(2)(a).
54. Id. § 7.85.C(2)(b). Although the phrase "date in question" is not defined, it is assumed
to refer either to the date on which the business combination is proposed or the date on which
compliance is achieved, or both, if such events occur simultaneously.
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succeed a Disinterested Director by a majority of the Disinterested Directors
then in office."
B. Section 7.85
1. The Supermajority Voting Requirement
Unlike the 1978 Act, which directly regulated the tender offer stage of the
acquisition, section 7.85 is triggered only after the successful completion of
the tender offer but before the commencement of the second stage of the
takeover. Section 7.85.A specifies five categories of control transactions,
entitled "business combinations," which tend to derogate the rights of
minority shareholders in the forced second stage of the front-end-loaded
takeover. Section 7.85 prohibits the consummation of any such business
combination unless it is approved first by an eighty percent supermajority
of all shares entitled to vote, including the shares of the Interested Share-
holder, and second, by a simple majority of all shares entitled to vote,
excluding those of the Interested Shareholder.5 6
The first two categories of business combinations include any merger,
consolidation, or share exchange with the target,"1 or any sale, lease, ex-
change, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition of at least ten percent
of the target's consolidated net worth." These two categories of transactions
were included within the protected class of business combinations to prevent
the Interested Shareholder from disposing of the target's assets in a manner
which effectively forces out the minority.59
The third category of business combination is the issuance or transfer of
any of the target's securities to an Interested Shareholder. 60 This provision
serves several protective functions. First, it prevents those in control of the
target from selling control to an Interested Shareholder without regard for
the interests of the minority. 6' Second, it prevents a successful tender offeror
which has become an Interested Shareholder from acquiring sufficient stock
to "greenmail" 62 the corporation or from issuing to itself or to an ally an
55. Id. § 7.85.C(7)(b).
56. Id. § 7.85.A. Compare MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-602(2) (1985) (requires
affirmative vote of two-thirds of disinterested shareholdings) with MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
21.2000(775)-(784) (Callaghan 1985) (requires issuance of "advisory statement" by board in
addition to approval by shareholders).
57. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.A(l)(a). Hereinafter, the term "target" shall
include any subsidiary of the target.
58. Id. § 7.85.A(1)(b).
59. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 275.
60. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.A(1)(c).
61. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 276.
62. "Greenmail" is frequently and pejoratively referred to as legalized blackmail of the
securities markets. A greenmailer typically acquires a sufficient interest in the target to forewarn
management of a possible takeover attempt. To ward off additional purchases and to preserve
incumbent management's control, the target reacquires the greenmailer's shares at a substantial
premium. See generally Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of
Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAw. 1545 (1980) (discussing problems associated with
issuer stock repurchases as a takeover response).
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amount of stock sufficient to meet the supermajority voting requirements of
section 7.85.A. 63
The fourth category of business combination is any plan for the liqui-
dation or dissolution of the target which either is proposed by the Interested
Shareholder or in which the Interested Shareholder will receive anything
other than cash. 6The purpose of this provision is to prevent the Interested
Shareholder from looting, liquidating or otherwise squandering the assets
of the target. The last category of business combination includes securities
transactions such as stock reclassifications, recapitalizations, mergers, con-
solidations and share exchanges 5 which have the effect of increasing the
percentage of the Interested Shareholder's control over the target.6
2. The Price and Procedure Requirements
Section 7.85.B waives the supermajority voting requirement for approval
of business combinations in favor of the more lenient voting requirements
of the Business Corporation Act6 7 if the Interested Shareholder complies
with either of two alternative procedures. The first alternative, set forth in
section 7.85.B(l), exempts from the supermajority voting requirement any
business combination receiving approval of two-thirds of the Disinterested
Directors. The purpose of this provision is to encourage negotiated take-
overs." The second alternative, set forth in section 7.85.B(2), waives the
supermajority voting requirement if the Interested Shareholder complies with
certain price and procedure conditions that are intended to compensate the
second stage shareholders on a parity with the highest price paid by the
acquiror to the tendering shareholders during the tender offer stage of the
63. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 276. Cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(e)
(McKinney 1986) (New York's anti-greenmail provision which prohibits a resident corporation
from purchasing more than ten percent of its own stock from a stockholder for more than
market value unless the purchase is approved by the board of directors and a majority of all
outstanding shares, including those of the Interested Shareholder).
64. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.A(l)(d).
65. Id. § 7.85.A(l)(e).
66. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 276.
67. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.B(l). See infra note 143.
68. Hanks, State Takeover Laws: The Second Generation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at
34. Compare Illinois' friendly offeror exemption with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-231 to 14-2-235
(Harrison 1985) (board may exempt a friendly takeover if it is unanimously approved by the
board's continuing directors, provided that the continuing directors constitute at least three
members of the board at the time of approval or that the transaction is recommended by at
least two-thirds of the continuing directors and approved by a majority of the disinterested
shareholders); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397 (Baldwin 1986) (permitting a majority of the
disinterested members of a Kentucky board to approve a business combination at any time);
MD. Copp. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (1985) (permitting a board to
exempt a transaction prior to the time a bidder acquires enough shares to become an Interested
Shareholder).
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takeover. 69 The price conditions differ depending on the type of stock
involved in the transaction.
When common stock is at issue, section 7.85.B(2)(a) requires the Interested
Shareholder to pay the holders of common stock the highest price as between
one of four formulas:
The higher of: Illustration
FORMULA I: The highest price 25
per common share paid by the In-
terested Shareholder in the two year
period prior to the Announcement
Date.7"
OR
FORMULA II: The highest price 20
per common share paid by the In-
terested Shareholder in the transac-
tion in which it became an In-
terested Shareholder."'
Thehigher of:
FORMULA III: The fair market 23
value 2 per common share on the
first trading date after the An-
nouncement Date. 3
OR
69. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.B(2).
70. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(a)(l)(a). The "Announcement Date" is defined as the date of the first
public announcement of the proposal of the business combination. Id.
71. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(a)(l)(b).
72. Section 7.85.C(8) of the Business Corporation Act defines "fair market value" as:
(a) in the case of shares, the highest closing sale price during the 30-day period
immediately preceding the date in question of a share on the New York Stock
Exchange Composite Tape, or, if such shares are not quoted on the Composite
Tape, on the New York Stock Exchange, or, if such shares are not listed on such
Exchange, on the principle United States securities exchange registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on which such shares are listed, or, if such shares
are not listed on any such exchange, the highest closing sale price or bid quotation
with respect to a share during the 30-day period preceding the date in question on
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Automated Quotations System
or any system then in use, or if no such quotations are available, the fair market
value on the date in question of a share as determined by a majority of the
Disinterested Directors in good faith; and (b) in the case of property other than
cash or shares, the fair market value of such property on the date in question as
determined by a majority of the Disinterested Directors in good faith.
Id.
73. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(a)(2).
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FORMULA IV: The fair market 21
value per common share on the first
trading date after the Determination
Date. "'
According to this illustration, the Interested Shareholder will have to pay
the second stage shareholders $25.00, an amount greater than both the tender
offer price or the stock's fair market value under Formulas III and IV.
Where stock other than common stock is at issue, section 7.85.B(2)(b)
requires that all such shareholders receive in exchange for all such shares
the higher of the following formulas:
The higher of: Illustration
FORMULA V: The highest price 30
per such share paid by the Inter-
ested Shareholder in the two year
period prior to the Announcement
Date."1
OR
FORMULA VI: The highest price 20
per such share paid by the Inter-
ested Shareholder in the transaction
in which it became an Interested
Shareholder.7
6
FORMULA VII: The highest 25
preferential amount to which such
shareholders are entitled upon li-
quidation, dissolution or winding up
of the corporation."
FORMULA VIII: The higher of 25/22
the fair market value of such stock
on the first trading date after the
Announcement Date or on the
Determination Date.
7 8
74. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(a)(2). The "Determination Date" is defined as the first trading date
after the first public announcement that the Interested Shareholder became an Interested
Shareholder. Id.
75. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(b)(l)(a).
76. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(b)(l)(b).
77. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(b)(2).
78. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(b)(3).
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FORMULA IX: Formula VII 26 x 30/30 = 26
multiplied by the highest value ob-
tained in the following calculation
for each such class of stock ac-
quired by the Interested Shareholder
on the Announcement Date: the
highest price per share paid by the
Interested Shareholder for such
shares acquired within such period
divided by the market value per
share of such stock on the first day
in such period on which the In-
terested Shareholder acquired any
such stock."
According to this illustration, the second stage preferred shareholders will
receive $26.00 per share for their stock, an amount equal to that received
by the tendering shareholders for their stock. However, if the illustration is
altered such that the Formula V price of $30.00 is lowered to $20.00, the
Formula IX multiplier results in the windfall payment of $32.50 to the
second stage preferred shareholders (i.e., 26 x (25) = $32.50) - an amount
substantially in excess of either the fair market value of the stock or its
tendering price. These illustrations indicate two things: (i) the formulas are
not necessarily rational, that is, they do not necessarily result in a price
borne out by the market, and (ii) if the stock is increasing in value, which
is usually the case in a tender offer, second stage shareholders will receive
a windfall, especially if the Formula IX multiplier is used. Conversely, if
the stock is declining in value, second stage shareholders will suffer a loss.
3. Consideration
The price and procedure provisions require the Interested Shareholder to
compensate second stage shareholders either with cash or with the same type
of consideration previously used to acquire identical stock. 0 In the event
that various types of consideration were used to purchase such stock, the
Interested Shareholder is required to compensate the second stage shareholder
either with cash or with the same type of consideration used to acquire the
largest number of such shares."' The cash payment requirement is intended
to insure that second stage shareholders receive valuable consideration for
79. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(b)(4).
80. Id. § 7.85.B(4)(c).
81. Id. § 7.85.B(4)(c).
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their stock by eliminating acquisitional strategies requiring shareholders to
exchange their equity securities in the target for subordinated debt securities
of the acquiror, otherwise known as junk bonds."2
4. Further Assurances
Section 7.85 provides additional protection to second stage shareholders
in terms of further assurances that the corporation will be duly maintained
during the period between the expiration of the tender offer and the con-
summation of the business combination. 3 For example, the shareholders are
assured that dividend policies will be maintained" and that the Interested
Shareholder will not be permitted to take undue advantage of the target by
taking loans, advances or other forms of financial assistance from its
treasury.8 5 Lastly, the shareholders are assured that compliance with the
Amendments will not relieve the Interested Shareholder of compliance with
the full panoply of fiduciary duties imposed by law. 6
C. Section 8.85
Section 8.85 provides:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of direc-
tors, committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers
may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the
effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the
corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located and all other pertinent factors. 7
Section 8.85 expands upon the protections traditionally afforded directors
under the business judgment rule88 by permitting the board to consider, in
82. See Greenblatt & Junewicz, Illinois Cools the Takeover Fever, DIECTORSmP, Feb.
1986, at 6.
83. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.B(2)(d).
84. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(a), (b), (d)(1).
85. Id. § 7.85.B(2)(e).
86. Id. § 7.85.D.
87. Id. § 8.85.
88. The business judgment rule restrains the judiciary from interfering with and substituting
its own judgment for business decisions made by directors in good faith and with a reasonable
basis for believing their decisions to be in the corporation's best interest. 3A FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 1039 (1975).
Section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act implicitly incorporates the business
judgment rule by requiring a director to perform duties "in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use." MODEL BUSINESS CoRu'. ACT § 8.30
(1984). The Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 section 8.05 does not incorporate this
language or otherwise discuss the standard by which directors are to exercise their duty.
Nevertheless, the Business Corporation Act section 8.75 provides broad indemnification pro-
visions for officers and directors who act in good faith.
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the lawful discharge of its duties, factors extrinsic to the immediate financial
well-being of the corporation. The business judgment rule is a principle of
judicial noninterference with managerial decisions undertaken free of fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest. 9 The rule is based on the presumption that
management is better suited than the judiciary to direct corporate affairs. 9°
Traditionally, the business judgment rule has shielded only those managerial
decisions that are commercially reasonable, that is, rationally related to a
legitimate business purpose. 9' The legitimate business purpose requirement
has been narrowly confined to decisions made by or under the direction of
the board which place a premium on maximizing profitability for the benefit
of the corporation and its shareholders. 92
89. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, at 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). In the takeover context, there is no liability for rejection of a proposed
takeover if the board's decision is made in good faith and reasonably based on the facts
presented. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1186 (N.D. 111. 1980), aff'd,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
90. See supra notes 88-89.
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981) (where plaintiff shows director's motive was to retain control, the burden shifts
to the defendant director to prove a valid business purpose).
Recent case law applying the business judgment rule continues to narrow the class of
managerial decisions subject to its protections. For example, the recent case of Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) held that directors of a target corporation were grossly
negligent in approving a friendly merger proposal and, therefore, could be held personally
liable for the difference between the merger price and the fair value of the shares. But see
Herald v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) in which the court stated that directors of
newspapers have an obligation to "employees, and to the public," as well as to the stockholder.
Id. at 1091. Thus, the directors were justified in opposing a takeover which they determined
would have an "adverse impact on the character and quality" of the newspaper and which
would lead to "poor relations with employees." Id. at 1092. See infra note 104.
92. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). Ford Motor
Co. had experienced its most profitable year ever, reaping an excess of almost $60,000,000 in
profits. Nonetheless, Henry Ford, the 58% shareholder, refused to permit the board to declare
a special dividend for the benefit of the shareholders. Mr. Ford preferred to reinvest the profits
back into the company to capitalize an expansion program which would increase the volume
of cars produced while lowering their price. The immediate net effect of this expansion program
would be to reduce the $111,000,000 surplus from which the shareholder's dividends were
drawn. The Dodge brothers, 220o owners of the Ford Motor Company, brought an action to
compel the company to pay out a special dividend. Ford argued that the board's decision to
direct the profits into the expansion program was a legitimate business decision tainted neither
by fraud, illegality, nor conflict of interest and, thus, was not subject to judicial review. The
court rejected Ford's defense on the grounds that it was improper to operate a for-profit
business as if it were an "eleemosynary institution" placing a premium on distributing profits
to the employees and the community at large at the expense of the shareholders. Id. at 504-
10, 170 N.W. at 683-85.
But cf. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Il. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968). In Shlensky, the
minority shareholders faced the Ford-like dominance of P.K. Wrigley who insisted that the
Chicago Cubs baseball team play only day games because "baseball is a daytime sport" and
because he feared night games would have a deteriorating effect on the surrounding neighbor-
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Section 8.85 raises the specter of a significantly expanded business judg-
ment rule. Its broad language strongly suggests that the board's section 8.85
considerations may extend not only to nonshareholder constituencies previ-
ously excluded from the rule's protection, but also, to "any action" of the
acquiror as well as of the board. Although a consequence of section 8.85
may be to minimize the destabilizing effects of takeovers on the long term
planning of a corporation, by allowing incumbent management to provide
protection for and against a broad range of interests section 8.85, in effect,
allows the target's board to develop a ubiquitous environmental impact
statement as a defense tactic to a hostile takeover.93
Significantly, section 8.85 protects incumbent management from more than
the unwarranted grasp of an external challenge. By allowing the board to
consider factors traditionally held beyond the protection of the business
judgment rule, section 8.85 potentially juxtaposes the interests of the share-
holders, to whom the board owes multiple fiduciary duties, 94 against the
interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, customers, or community,
to which the board owes no fiduciary duties. Offered almost as a quid pro
quo to the target's shareholders in exchange for the fair price and procedure
protections of section 7.85, section 8.85 fortifies management's defense
posture against its own shareholders by shielding management from internal
challenges to the board's defense strategy in the form of shareholder actions
alleging breaches of fiduciary duties and violations of the Williams Act."
hood. Id. at 176, 237 N.E.2d at 778. Plaintiff Shlensky alleged that night games would increase
the corporation's profits and that the board's rejection of night lights was based on factors
extrinsic to the financial success of the corporation. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, finding that the best interests of the corporation may
require consideration of nonfinancial factors and, that courts should only reluctantly interfere
in business decisions: "[Clourts may not decide these questions [of corporate policy] in the
absence of a clear showing of dereliction of duty on the part of the specific directors and mere
failure to 'follow the crowd' is not such a dereliction." Id. at 183, 237 N.E.2d at 781.
93. It is important to note that section 8.85 generally applies to all management decisions,
not just those affecting takeovers. This Article does not address and does not denigrate the
potential merit of section 8.85 considerations in contexts other than the tender offer. This
Article also does not address the question of whether section 8.85 can be upheld as a rational
provision for the economy at large but struck down when applied to the securities economy in
the takeover context.
94. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107
S. Ct. 1637 (1987). "The officers and directors are the agents and fiduciaries of the shareholders
and owe a duty of complete loyalty which is inconsistent with erecting insuperable barriers to
hostile takeovers." Id. at 254.
95. Compare Business Corporation Act of 1983 section 8.85 with the right of redemption
afforded dissident shareholders under Maryland's takeover statute, MD. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CODE
ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (Supp. 1984) which lermits a shareholder who objects to a
business combination to demand cash payment for the fair value of his stock. Fair value is
determined at an appraisal proceeding by applying the same tests that are used to determine
whether or not a business combination is exempt from the higher voting requirements under
the formula price provisions of the statute. Compare Business Corporation Act of 1983 section
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As a result, shareholders will be left defenseless against the hostile maneuvers
of their own management. 96
D. Summary
Applied in concert, sections 7.85 and 8.85 provide incumbent management
of Illinois corporations with two potent lines of defense against the modern
hostile takeover. Under section 7.85, the first line of defense protects incum-
bent management against undesirable offers by increasing the risks and
expenses of a hostile acquisition. Shareholder approval for the second stage
will no doubt be difficult to obtain since management controls the proxy
process which inevitably follows the proposal of a business combination.9"
In light of the windfall potential of the pricing formulas, an informed
shareholder will have little incentive to tender in the first stage of the
acquisition let alone vote for the business combination in the second stage.
Under section 8.85, the second line of defense protects incumbent man-
agement by insulating it from the internal challenges of its own shareholders.
Considerations which previously had been reserved for the exclusive benefit
of the shareholders under the business judgment rule may now extend to a
broad range of nonshareholder constituencies. Ironically, while section 7.85
protects minority shareholders from the enemy without, section 8.85 elimi-
nates their protection from the enemy within.
III. COMMENTARY
According to Justice White, who wrote the Edgar v. MITE opinion, several
provisions of the 1978 Act violated the supremacy clause because they
8.85 with Pennsylvania's takeover statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1985)
which, in addition to containing section 8.85 language, also contains an offsetting "put"
provision which entitles shareholders to the right to demand the fair value for their stock in
cash following a "transaction" in which an acquiror "crosses a particular ownership threshold."
See Junewicz, The Supremacy Clause and the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes, in
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CouRsE OF STUDY: DIRECTIONS IN STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION: THEs SECOND
GENERATION STATUTES 129, 176 (1986).
96. To date, there is scarce case law addressing the questions of whether directors may
oppose takeover bids that are in the best interests of the shareholders on the basis of adverse
impact on nonshareholder constituencies or, conversely, whether directors can support takeover
bids that are not in the shareholders' interest. See Junewicz, supra note 95, at 162-64. See also,
e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the Delaware
Supreme Court extended business judgment protection to defensive measures "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed." Id. at 949. The court defined "threat" to include impact on
nonshareholder constituencies such as creditors, customers, employees, and the general com-
munity. Id. at 955.
97. See Junewicz, supra note 95, at 170. An Interested Shareholder is required to acquire
shares held by management, shares held by pension funds subject to management control,
shares held by shareholders who never vote, and shares held by shareholders who will always
oppose a takeover. To date, no bidder has successfully overcome these obstacles. Hanks, supra
note 68, at 34.
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conflicted with the time and informational provisions of the Williams Act 9
and imposed both direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce that
far exceeded the local benefits it purported to serve. 99 Illinois' second gen-
eration takeover legislation attempts to avoid these pitfalls by steering a
wholly different course. Whereas the 1978 Act ran afoul of the Williams
Act by directly regulating the tender offer stage of the acquisition, the 1985
Amendments purport to regulate only the second stage of the takeover
wherein the corporation, by undergoing a fundamental corporate change,
forces out the second stage shareholders at a price below that offered to the
tendering shareholders. The Amendments attempt to mitigate the sting of
the force-out by requiring the Interested Shareholder to comply with either
the fair price or supermajority voting requirements.
Theoretically, by defining the rights and duties as between controlling and
minority shareholders in transactions resulting in fundamental corporate
changes, the Amendments should implicate only the internal affairs of the
corporation and suffer no conflict with either the supremacy or commerce
clauses. Such a conflict is manifest, however, in the theoretical justification
offered for the Amendments. Although the Amendments purport to regulate
merely the internal affairs of domestic corporations, their secondary effects
on the market place raise the specter of economic protectionism violating
both the supremacy and commerce clauses. The Amendments violate the
supremacy clause because they pose a program for deterring acquisitional
activity in Illinois that is incompatible with the regulatory scheme provided
by the Williams Act. By deterring acquisitional activity in Illinois, the
Amendments also impose burdens on interstate commerce that far exceed
the local interests they purport to serve. Hence, the Amendments must fall
of their own weight under either the supremacy clause, the commerce clause,
or both.
98. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639. The Williams Act seeks to protect the investor by prohibiting
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts," as well as false and misleading statements made
in connection with a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1986). To further protect shareholders,
the Williams Act requires that upon commencement of a tender offer, the offeror provide a
Schedule 14D-1 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the target, and its share-
holders disclosing information about its background and identity, the source of the funds to
be used in making the purchase, the purpose of the purchase including any plans to liquidate
the company or make major changes in its corporate structure, and the extent of the offeror's
holdings in the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1986). The Williams Act also permits
shareholders who have tendered their shares to withdraw them during the first fifteen days of
the tender offer, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(l) (1985), and at any time after sixty days from the
commencement of the offer. 15 U.S.C § 78n(d)(5). A shareholder who has already tendered
may receive the benefit of an increased offering price. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1981). Furthermore,
SEC Rule 14e-l(a) requires that a tender offer remain open for a minimum period of twenty
business days. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 632.
99. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646.
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A. The Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause'00 stands for the proposition that when a state law
so conflicts with a federal law that compliance with the state law prevents
compliance with the federal law, the state law must yield.' 0' Although the
Williams Act does not necessarily preempt state regulation of cash tender
offers, 0 2 it is clear after Edgar v. MITE that second generation takeover
legislation may neither conflict with specific provisions of the Williams Act,
nor run afoul of its market approach'0 3 of providing full disclosure to in-
vestors, nor provide either contender with an undue advantage that could
frustrate the investors' exercise of that informed choice.' 0 4
100. Article VI of the United States Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of and
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoN s. art. VI.
101. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
102. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue
grounds sub. nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). "Congress did not
explicitly prohibit States from regulating takeovers; it left the determination whether [a particular
state] statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 631 (1982). Subsequent Supreme Court cases have found that the supremacy clause will
preempt a state statute where: (i) a valid federal statute expressly prohibits the state regulation
imposed; (ii) "compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility;"
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); (iii) the state
"law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objective of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See MITE, 457 U.S. at
631. MITE's supremacy clause analysis of the Illinois takeover statute raised the issue of whether
the statute "frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way." Id. at 632.
See generally Junewicz, supra note 95, at 133-34.
103. The Williams Act is premised upon a market oriented approach, the goal of which "is
to get information to the investor by allowing both the offeror and the incumbent managers
of a target company to present fully their arguments and then let the investor decide for
himself." Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue
grounds sub. nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The market approach
assumes that neutrality between the target, its shareholders, and the offeror is essential to the
proper operation of the market. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1129
(8th Cir. 1982). See also Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) ("Congress was
committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for corporate control."). Once the appropriate
information is forthcoming, the Williams Act presumes that "the takeover battle should be
decided by the 'market,' and that federal law should not tilt the regulatory balance toward
either target management or the bidder." Sargent, supra note 39, at 195 (quoting Warren,
Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671, 674
n.18 (1985)).
104. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634. It is noteworthy in MITE that Justice White could secure the
votes of only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun in finding that the 1978 Act violated
the supremacy clause. MITE, however, did not interrupt the unbroken string of decisions which
found first generation state takeover laws unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. Compare
the following post-MITE cases: Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565-66
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Unlike the 1978 Act, the Amendments do not directly regulate the tender
offer stage of the takeover.' Rather, the Amendments directly regulate only
the second stage of the acquisition in which the corporation undergoes a
fundamental corporate change. Thus, the Amendments do not pose a direct
conflict with specific provisions of the Williams Act. Nonetheless, the
Amendments may run afoul of the supremacy clause if by indirection or
implication they embody a philosophy of takeover regulation that is incom-
patible with the balance of neutrality between incumbent management and
the acquiror required by the Williams Act. °0
There are several provisions of the Amendments that weight the contest in
favor of incumbent management. Section 7.85.A significantly increases
the cost to the bidder of engaging in a hostile takeover campaign against an
Illinois corporation. 0 7 Section 7.85.B(1) allows the Disinterested Directors
to vote for their own entrenchment.' Section 7.85.B(2) exempts friendly
tender offers from the price and procedure constraints of section 7.85.B(l).
Section 9.05 exempts self-tenders from any of the provisions of section
7.85.109 Finally, section 8.85 allows management to develop, with impunity,
defense strategies premised upon factors of attenuated importance to the
corporation." 0 Each provision is ripe with the potential of benefitting man-
agement against unwelcome tender offer activity.
What countervailing advantages do the Amendments offer the takeover
bidder? None. The clear thrust of the Amendments is to accelerate the risks
and costs of a hostile takeover in the second stage of the acquisition for
the purpose of inhibiting the making of the tender offer in the first stage.
As a consequence, the Amendments clearly shift the balance of neutrality
in favor of incumbent management. Do the additional benefits afforded
management run afoul of the supremacy clause?"' Not necessarily. The
Williams Act requires "maintenance of an equitable balance between con-
(6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan act); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1982) (Missouri act) and Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky act)
with the following pre-MITE cases: Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980)
(New Jersey act); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho
act).
105. In Edgar v. MITE, the Court defined a tender offer as the stage of the acquisition that
"contemplate[s] transfer of stock by stockholders to a third party and [which] do[es] not [itself]
implicate the internal affairs of the target company." MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
106. See supra note 102. See generally Sargent, supra note 2, at 689, 694 (discusses judicial
views on how various statutory takeover provisions effectuate or interfere with neutrality).
107. See supra notes 56-96 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that the term "Disinterested
Director" may be a misnomer since it refers to persons who may have either professional or
personal stakes in maintaining the status quo. See Greenblatt & Junewicz, supra note 82, at 7.
109. See supra notes 56-86.
110. See supra notes 87-96.
111. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 714-15.
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tending sides . . . as a principal means of investor protection.""' 2 Certainly
the Amendments do not prohibit altogether tender offers of domestic cor-
porations, nor do they tilt the balance so far in management's favor as to
insure it of an outright victory." 3 On the other hand, the Amendments will
significantly deter, if not eliminate,' 4 certain types of tender offer activity
which, in turn, will deprive shareholders not only of the opportunity to sell
their shares at a premium, but of the need to make an informed decision
in the first instance."' In this regard, the Amendments' pro-management
bias may vary impermissibly from the balance of neutrality unless it is
counterbalanced by provisions that "substantially enhance" the target
shareholders' ability to make an informed decision.6
What countervailing protections do the Amendments provide shareholders?
By insuring that all shareholders receive "full" value for their stock, the
Amendments minimize the coercive effects of the second stage of the takeover
while enabling the shareholders to make a rational choice in the first stage. '7
This result enhances the protection afforded shareholders by the time and
informational provisions of the Williams Act. Furthermore, the price and
procedure constraints of section 7.85.A should deter only those bidders whose
strategies are premised upon differential compensation as between tendering
and nontendering shareholders." 8 Even assuming the desirability of takeovers,
there is nothing in the Williams Act suggesting that minority shareholders
may be subject to a forced squeeze-out at an inadequate price.1 '9
Will these shareholder protections save the Amendments from challenge
under the supremacy clause? Not necessarily. While section 7.85.D imposes
on the Interested Shareholder the traditional panoply of fiduciary duties, it
makes no mention of the duties imposed on incumbent management. 20
Rather, the duties to which incumbent management are held are addressed in
section 8.85 which allows the board to consider, on a parity with its fiduciary
duties, factors of potentially attenuated importance to the corporation and its
shareholders. In so doing, section 8.85 interposes on management's behalf
a statutory defense-the welfare of nonshareholder constituencies-to the
112. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub noma. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1983).
113. MITE, 633 F.2d at 498.
114. See Greenblatt & Junewicz, supra note 82, at 6.
115. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-56 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
116. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 715.
117. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 289.
118. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
119, But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630-631 (D. Md.
1982); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311-13 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (implicitly recognizing
and permitting the front-end-loaded takeover under the federal regulations).
120. Business Corporation Act § 7.85.D.
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shareholders' remedy for abuse of fiduciary duty.' 2' The attendant sterili-
zation of the target's shareholders provides "a weapon for management to
discourage takeover bids"' 122 in contravention of the Williams Act's policy
of protecting investors by "providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
management."1 23
In sum, section 7.85 neither directly nor indirectly conflicts with the specific
provisions or underlying policies of the Williams Act. Although the thrust
of section 7.85 clearly favors incumbent management, its provisions elimi-
nating compensation differentials between tendering and nontendering share-
holders and thus, the coercive effects of the front-end-loaded takeover, are
philosophically and practically compatible with the Williams Act's policy of
investor protection. Accordingly, although section 7.85 shifts the balance of
neutrality in favor of management, the balance is arguably restruck within
acceptable limits by the pricing protections afforded shareholders. Section
8.85, however, poses a philosophy of takeover regulation which is incon-
sistent not only with the balance of neutrality struck by the Williams Act,
but with the purported shareholder protections conferred by section 7.85 as
well. The broad and unqualified language of section 8.85 not only fortifies
incumbent management as against "any action" by the aggressor, but also
provides an effective shield against shareholder challenges to management's
own defense tactics. By shifting the balance of neutrality heavily in favor of
incumbent management with no countervailing shareholder protection, sec-
tion 8.85 causes the entire regulatory scheme posed by the Amendments to
fall beyond any acceptable range of neutrality contemplated by the Williams
Act.
B. The Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the commerce clause'24 as
a limitation upon the power of the states to erect barriers to interstate
commerce.' 21 Accordingly, the commerce clause prohibits direct regulation
121. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
122. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58
(1975)).
123. Id. at 633 (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)). See Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
124. The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. In Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) the Supreme Court observed that these "few simple words":
reflected a central concern of the Framers that was a immediate reason for calling
the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles
of Confederation.
Id. at 325-26.
125. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
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of interstate commerce by the states 26 but permits the states to indirectly
regulate interstate commerce if they do so "evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local interest, and [the] effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 1 21 Hence, the pertinent
inquiry under the commerce clause is whether the Amendments regulate
intra- and interstate activities evenhandedly or whether they impose burdens
on interstate commerce that are excessive in light of the local interests they
purport to protect. 28
The Amendments purport to regulate only the internal affairs 29 of Illinois
corporations by defining the rights and duties between minority and majority
shareholders in certain business combinations. Section 8.85 defines the pa-
rameters of reasonable board action by specifying the factors upon which
the board can rely in discharging its duties to the corporation. Section 7.85
addresses the duties to which minority shareholders can hold majority
shareholders in the event of a fundamental corporate change undertaken
pursuant to a control transaction. Accordingly, under the internal affairs
approach, the Amendments should impose no greater burdens on interstate
commerce than similar control transactions regulated by the Business Cor-
poration Act. For example, under section 11.20 a merger cannot be consum-
mated unless it has received approval of two-thirds of the shares entitled to
vote. Such state regulation undoubtedly delays and deters some acquisitional
activity yet has not been deemed an excessive extraterritorial grasp that
offends "sister states and exceeds the inherent limits of the state's power."' 3
Similarly, the Amendments require the Interested Shareholder to comply with
either the supermajority voting requirements or the formula-price requirements
126. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640; Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71
(1976) (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
127. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting with approval Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970) which cites Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960)).
128. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
129. There is little consensus as to the definition of "internal affairs." A frequently cited
definition was set forth in North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 65 Md. 151, 20
A. 1039 (1885):
[Where] the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as
a member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder, director, president, or
other officer, and is the act of the corporation, or through its agents, the board of
directors, then such action is the management of the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration.
Id. at 154, 20 A. at 1040.
In theory, corporate internal affairs usually refer to the duties and liabilities of directors
and officers, voting and meeting procedures, transfers of shares, and access to records, etc. In
practice, however, corporate internal affairs can be external in reach. See DeMott, Perspectives
in Corporate Internal Affairs, 28 Coi'. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 347, 369 (1986). See also Sargent,
supra note 39, at 192-95.
130. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 43 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
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before causing the target to enter into a merger or other fundamental
corporate change. Hence, by imposing similar restrictions on similar trans-
actions, the Amendments should have no greater or lesser extraterritorial
effect upon interstate commerce than similar provisions adopted by the
Business Corporation Act and traditionally subject to state regulation.'3 '
The internal affairs approach to takeover regulation, however, must be
counterbalanced against the requirements of the commerce clause. Assuming
that Illinois, or any state, has the power to regulate interstate activity at all,
it must do so evenhandedly. 3 2 Therein lie the three principle weaknesses of
Illinois's internal affairs approach to takeover regulation.' 33
1. The Internal Affairs Rule
In Edgar v. MITE, the Court characterized corporate internal affairs as
discrete "matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the cor-
poration and its current officers, directors and shareholders."' 3 4 Because of
131. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 727.
132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Recent commerce clause cases
impose upon the states the necessity of demonstrating that no less restrictive alternatives exist
to legislative schemes that burden interstate commerce. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 417 (1978).
133. Five recent decisions have held unconstitutional control share acquisition statutes. See
supra note 6. In distinguishing between laws that regulate the acquisition of stock and laws
that regulate how stock is used in a corporation's internal affairs, the court in APL Ltd.
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985) rejected the state's
argument that the control share acquisition statute was analogous to internal affairs laws
requiring shareholder approval for asset sales or corporate reformation. The APL court offered
the following distinction between the two types of laws:
In the present case the [statute] restricts the ability of a nonresident shareholder
to sell shares to a nonresident third party. The defendant's argument that the
[statute] is simply an 'internal affairs' regulation stems from a failure to distinguish
between the acquisition of shares and the exercise of power as a result of that
acquisition. The acquisition of shares does not implicate the internal affairs of the
target corporation. The use of that power once the shares have been acquired may
well be a proper subject of state regulation, but that is not what the [statute]
regulates.
Id. at 1223-24 (emphasis in original). See generally Scriggins & Clark, supra note 11, at 272-
79 (Maryland law affects only the second step-the state law voting requirement for mergers);
Hanks, supra note 68, at 34-46.
134. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645. In general, the Court noted that the internal affairs doctrine
was a conflict of laws principle "of little use to the State in this context." Id. at 644. In
particular, the Court rejected Illinois' assertion that the 1978 Act merely regulated the internal
affairs of domestic corporations as "incredible" in light of its extraterritorial impact. Id. Even
assuming the applicability of the internal affairs doctrine, the Court was skeptical that it would
"substantially enhance" the shareholders' decision making ability, id., since the pertinent
provisions under the 1978 Act added nothing to comparable Williams Act provisions while
increasing the "risk that the tender offer [would] fail due to [the] defensive tactics employed
by incumbent management." Id. at 645. Moreover, the Court noted that the 1978 Act exempted
self-tenders, thus leaving the target's shareholders to the protections of the federal securities
laws, "which Illinois view[ed] as inadequate to protect investors in other contexts." Id. at 644.
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their predominantly domestic impact, the regulation of internal affairs has
been relegated to the exclusive province of the states. 3 ' The internal affairs
approach to state takeover regulation rejects the position that takeovers are
merely securities transactions that "contemplate transfers of stock by stock-
holders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs
of the target company.' ' 3 6 Rather, the internal affairs approach assumes
that takeovers "are devices by which a frequently irreversible change in the
ownership and structure of a corporation is affected: their amenability to
federal regulation as securities transactions does not eliminate the possibility
of the need for state regulation of them as instruments of fundamental
corporate change."'
Section 7.85 transactions do not, on their face, differ substantially from other
control transactions regulated by the Business Corporation Act.' The critical
difference between such transactions is that section 7.85.A transactions
require an Interested Shareholder-a person who has already acquired a
significant interest in the corporation. By definition, section 7.85.A includes
a successful tender offeror although it could include other acquirors as well.
By contrast, a simple merger pursuant to section 11.20 does not require an
Interested Shareholder. Rather, it can apply even where there has been no
tender offer or no prior acquisitional activity. Thus, section 7.85.A, which
facially resembles an internal affairs provision, differs significantly from such
provisions by specifically implicating tender offers. Unlike other control trans-
actions which may be extraterritorial in scope and only incidentally affect
interstate commerce, section 7.85.A transactions are specifically drafted to
reach the interstate market for securities and corporate control.
2. "Domestic Corporations"
Illinois attempted to minimize the extraterritorial impact of the Amend-
ments by limiting their reach to "domestic corporations" only. Under sec-
tions 1.80(a) and (b), a domestic corporation is one that is subject to the
provisions of the Business Corporation Act and is not organized under the
135. Korn v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 192, 199-200 (1810) ("The law
of the state of incorporation governs the fundamental questions of a corporation's powers,
governance, and the rights of shareholders."). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975);
United States v. Insurance Co., 89 U.S. (20 Wall.) 99, 103-104 (1874); Profusek & Gompf,
State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?,
7 CoRP. L. REV. 3, 29 (1984); Sargent, supra note 2, at 724.
136. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645. See also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great United Corp,
443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho takeover statute was preempted by the Williams Act on the grounds
that it placed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
137. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 725.
138. E.g., Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 11.20 (mergers, consolidations, share ex-
changes); § 11.60 (sale, lease, or exchange of assets other than in the regular course of business);
§ 11.65 (right to dissent).
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laws of any other state."' Presumably, this definition is intended to restrict
the Amendments' reach to businesses incorporated under the Business Cor-
poration Act and already subject to its provisions. However, a definition of
domestic corporation that serves the Act's primarily local interests may be
too broad to satisfy the extraterritorial constraints of the Williams Act.
For example, under the internal affairs doctrine, the law of the state of
incorporation governs the corporation's internal affairs. 40 That the corpo-
ration has little, if any, local identity is irrelevant to the internal affairs
doctrine qua choice of law question. ' 4 1 Illinois' definition of "domestic cor-
poration" fails to account for corporations which, although incorporated
under Illinois law, have few resident shareholders, or insubstantial local ac-
tivities, or insubstantial assets within Illinois." ' Under the commerce clause
analysis, Illinois would be hard pressed to counterbalance a legitimate state
interest in protecting such nonlocal corporations against its clear intrusion
upon interstate commerce. To define a class of corporations of genuinely
local character, the Amendments should have limited the definition of
"target" to those "domestic corporations" having certain levels of resident
shareholders, business activities, or shareholdings in Illinois."43
3. Internal Inconsistencies
The Amendments are internally inconsistent with the legislative scheme
upon which they are based. The Amendments assume that the business
combinations it regulates implicate only the internal affairs of domestic
139. Id. § 1.80(a), (b).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (1971).
141. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 720.
142. Compare Illinois' definition of "target" with New York's definition of "target" which
requires that the corporation (i) be incorporated in New York, (ii) have significant business
operations located in New York, and (iii) have at least ten percent of its voting stock beneficially
owned by New York residents. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
143. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding the
Minnesota Takeover Act against a commerce clause challenge because it limited the definition
of target to corporations located in Minnesota, owned by at least 20% Minnesota residents,
and having "substantial assets" in Minnesota).
For an interesting framework for analyzing the internal affairs rule under the commerce
clause, see DeMott, supra note 131, at 371 which proposes the following inquiries:
Assessing the validity of these 'outreach' choice of law doctrines under the
commerce clause thus requires that a number of questions be addressed: (I) to what
extent does the application of local corporate law to internal affairs questions in
foreign corporations involve the regulation of interstate commerce; (2) if interstate
commerce is thereby regulated, is it regulated directly or only incidentally; (3) if the
regulation is incidental, does it burden interstate commerce; (4) if interstate com-
merce is burdened by the regulation, is the burden disproportionate to any legitimate
local interests furthered by the regulation? Although answering some of these
questions is far from easy, the analytical process demonstrates considerable consti-
tutional vulnerability in the 'outreach' approach.
Id. at 371.
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corporations undergoing fundamental corporate changes. Theoretically, such
business combinations need not afford shareholders greater protection than
other transactions subject to the Business Corporation Act which also result
in fundamental corporate changes. Under the Business Corporation Act,
such transactions may be adopted by two-thirds of the shares entitled to
vote. 1' " Transactions subject to the Amendments, however, require adoption
by eighty percent of the shares entitled to vote. 145 Thus, the Amendments
recognize that some transactions resulting in fundamental corporate changes
are so potentially injurious to minority shareholders as to require increased
protection. The Amendments, however, do not provide increased shareholder
protection. Rather, the Amendments provide increased management protec-
tion. For example, the Amendments exempt friendly takeovers'4 from com-
pliance with the rigorous price and procedure requirements of section 7.85.A
by carrying forward the pro-management self-tender exemption objected to
in MITE.147 Consequently, second stage shareholders may not necessarily
receive either a full or fair price for their stock if the Interested Shareholder
can successfully woo the target's board.
More importantly, the inevitable thrust of section 7.85's rigorous price
and procedure requirements is to deter acquisitional activity for Illinois
corporations. The quid pro quo for section 7.85 is that all shareholders will
be guaranteed full value in any front-end-loaded takeover that is successful
- provided any is attempted. In the event that a non-front-end-loaded
takeover is attempted, sections 7.85 and 8.85 leave the target's shareholders
virtually without recourse against either the aggressor or the defensive ma-
neuvers of the target's own board. Hence, the MITE objections, which may
well pertain to the Amendments' self-tender and friendly takeover exceptions,
are compounded by the inhibiting effects of sections 7.85 and 8.85.141
It can also be argued that by alleviating the threat of a hostile takeover,
the Amendments diminish managerial incentives to maximize corporate value
at the expense of their own entrenchment.' 4 9 The attendant interference with
144. Many sections of the Illinois Business Corporation Act permit or require a simple
majority or two-thirds share approval of corporate action. See, e.g., Business Corporation Act
of 1983 § 8.35 (requires simple majority vote for removal of directors); § 10.20 (requires two-
thirds share vote to amend articles); § 11.20 (requires two-thirds share approval for share ex-
change, merger, or consolidation); § 11.60 (requires two-thirds share approval for sales, leases,
exchanges not in usual and regular course of business).
145. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 7.85.A.
146. Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 9.05.
147. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
148. See Greenblatt & Junewicz, supra note 82, at 7.
149. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d at 253-56 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). The court stated, "To allow management to use its control of the
board of directors to frustrate all hostile takeovers would nullify an important protection for
shareholders. The threat of hostile takeover plays a vital role in keeping management on its
toes." Id. at 253-54.
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the market for corporate control may be inimical to the shareholders' long
term interest in profiting from their investments and to their short term in-
terest in making the investment in the first place.
C. Summary
In sum, the MITE Court rejected Illinois' assertion of a legislative scheme
which purported to regulate the internal affairs of domestic corporations
but which, in fact, strengthened the defense posture of incumbent manage-
ment to the detriment of the shareholders and the acquiror. Although cast in
a different format, the 1985 Amendments have not overcome these objec-
tions.
Although the Amendments do not directly regulate tender offers or violate
specific provisions of the Williams Act, they do directly regulate those
business combinations that are typically an integral phase of an acquisitional
program. More importantly, by favoring management against an unwelcome
aggressor, and by protecting management from its own shareholders, the
Amendments pose a philosophy of takeover regulation that is incompatible
with the market approach deemed critical to the balance of neutrality struck
by the Williams Act. As a result, Illinois' interpretation of the internal af-
fairs doctrine will result in extraterritorial extensions of its purportedly state-
specific laws and, in so doing, impose unreasonable burdens on interstate
commerce.
CONCLUSION
By enacting sections 7.85 and 8.85, the Illinois General Assembly has
taken one step forward and two steps back in its effort to provide economic
and legal protection to domestic corporations subject to unwelcome takeover
bids. Theoretically based upon the protection of minority shareholders from
the exploitative maneuvers of a potentially hostile controlling shareholder,
the Amendments, in fact, derogate shareholder protection in favor of in-
cumbent management.
Section 7.85 is premised upon the assumption that even though the pur-
chase of tendered stock is beyond the state's regulatory power, the exercise
of control over such stock is not. In effect, the tender offeror is free to
purchase stock over which it can exercise limited control unless it pays full
consideration to all shareholders of the target. Undoubtedly, the superma-
jority voting requirements and price and procedure requirements of section
7.85 will so increase the compliance and financial costs of a front-end-loaded
takeover bid as to substantially reduce the likelihood of such acquisitional
activity in Illinois. By making such tender offers less certain of success and
more costly to the offeror, the Amendments will substantially reduce the
aggregate number of opportunities for tendering shareholders to receive the
highest possible value for their investments. On the other hand, under section
7.85, no shareholder will be coerced into tendering prematurely for fear of
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being forced out later at an inadequate price. Incumbent management will
be permitted to stand its ground unless and until the acquiror pays full
consideration to all of the target's shareholders. Under the auspices of section
7.85, the front-end-loaded takeover and its attendant coercion based upon
compensation differentials between the first and second stage shareholders,-
will be substantially reduced. On its own merits, section 7.85 has negotiated
successfully the legal obstacles set forth in MITE.
The General Assembly, however, did not stop with section 7.85. It went
on to enact section 8.85's ubiquitous board considerations and in so doing
wrote incumbent management a "blank check endorsed with the 'business
judgment rule.' "110 Under the guise of the internal affairs doctrine, 5 ' section
8.85's pro-management bias so discriminates against shareholders and ac-
quirors as to conflict with the balance of neutrality required by the Williams
Act's market approach to takeover regulation. Section 8.85's antishareholder
and antiacquiror bias so discriminates against a broad range of intra- and
interstate control transactions as to impose unnecessary burdens on interstate
commerce without countervailing justification. As a consequence, acquirors
and shareholders will be prevented from benefiting from control transac-
tions having the potential of maximizing the profitability and economic well-
being of the corporation.
Taken in concert, the Amendments pose a program of corporate detente:
they reduce the risk of the target's eventual demise in the second stage of
the acquisition by escalating the financial and compliance costs to the
aggressor in the first stage. As a result, aggressors will refrain from sending
up their missiles knowing that, if provoked, the targets will send up theirs.
Like detente, while the contenders are assessing their capabilities, the share-
holders are powerless to alter the course of the ultimate outcome. Whatever
may be the merits of detente in minimizing conflict on an international basis,
its principles are inimical to the market approach of maximizing wealth on
the corporate level.
It is one thing for section 7.85 to protect target shareholders and man-
agement from economically questionable transactions such-as the front-end-
loaded takeover. It is quite another thing for section 8.85 to sterilize the
target shareholders by juxtaposing their interests against those of the cor-
poration's employees, creditors, suppliers, and communities. The effect of
section 7.85 may be to reduce some acquisitional interest in Illinois corpo-
rations. It may be economically unwise, but it is not unconstitutional. The
effect of section 8.85, however, will be to reduce substantially investment
150. Id.
151. Undor,similar circumstances, the Court has admonished lower courts not to be "bound
by the-fdescription, or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the state,'
but [to] determine for itself the practical impact of the law." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336 (1979) (quoting LaCosta v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924)).
19871
390 DEPAUL LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 36:361
interest in Illinois corporations by assisting the entrenchment of incumbent
management at the expense of shareholder protection. The section 8.85
wildcard casts substantial doubt upon the constitutionality of the entire
regulatory scheme. Consequently, not only do the prospects for the Amend-
ments bode poorly when subject to constitutional scrutiny, but should the
Amendments survive constitutional scrutiny, their consequences bode even
more poorly for Illinois' corporate well-being.
